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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WARREN STACK, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7387 
EDWIN J. KEARNES, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Warren Stack, plaintiff and respondent herein, sued Edwin 
J. Kearnes, defendant and appellant, for personal injuries 
arising out of an automobile accident October 12, 1947, in 
which respondent was riding as appellant's guest, when the 
Kearnes' car overturned around the Casper Cutoff, Holladay 
Boulevard at 4500 South Street, in Salt Lake County. As a 
result of the accident . the respondent's upper left ear was 
sloughed off and amputated. (Exhibits A, B, C, N, ahd 0.) 
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Prior to the trial, the parties stipulated (R-87) if defendant 
was found liable, the respondent's special damages were $207.34 
hospital bills and $152.00 loss of wages. The medical testi-
mony (R-231) showed that Dr. Burtis F. Robbins performed 
13 plastic surgery operations on the respondent's ear up to 
the time of the first trial and that respondent had been treated 
by Dr. Robbins in his office 75 other times, for which the 
doctor testified his services were reasonably worth $1,000.00 
(R-236). Respondent's special damages were $1,359.34, he 
asked for $25,000.00 general damages. The first trial resulted 
in a verdict for defendant on December 22, 1948 after the 
jury had deliberated about 15 minutes (R-40). 
Plaintiff moved for a new trial (R-96) on January 15, 
1949, on grounds therein stated and the matter was argued to 
the Court that date and continued for argument on January 
22, 1949, after which the trial court granted plaintiff's motion 
for new trial (R-97). 
A second trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the 
sum of $1,359.34 special damages and $500.00 general damages 
(R-15 3), after which defendant moved for a new trial, ~ithout 
argument, and which motion was denied (R-156). 
Plaintiff's complaint (R-2) alleged that defendant was 
guilty of willful misconduct in the operation of his car in that 
he not only drove at excessive rate of speed, upwards of 60 
miles per hour without having his car under control, and that 
he failed to keep a proper lookout, but that he drove his car 
recklessly attempting to take the cu~es on the highway whiCh 
he well knew to be there, heedless of the consequences, and 
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that he deliberately took and encouraged taking the risk of 
an accident, with utter disregard for plaintiti' s safety after 
plaintitf had warned defendant to drive cautiously and after 
the defendant had almost caused his car to collide \vith a 
utility pole rounding an earlier curve, about 1100 feet ahead 
of the curYe on which defendant overturned his car. (Under-
line supplied) . 
The gravity of plaintiff's charge and theory was that 
defendant stunt-drove his car taking the risk of the accident 
mindful that an accident and personal injury were both possible 
and probable consequences of his reckless driving and defiant 
mood. 
Because appellant's Brief fails to recite the physical facts 
and circumstances surrounding the highv1ay and accident it 
seems proper to expand this statement of facts: 
Defendant Keames admitted ihat he was well aware of the 
Casper Cutoff, (Exhibits D through L), Holladay Boulevard 
at 4500 South Street, he testified that he had driven over that 
route since 1943 v.rhen he was socially escorting Jane Potts who 
lived at 5900 Holladay Boulevard. This is the girl who testified 
as plaintiff's witness as Jane Potts Naisbett (R-303-304). 
Kearnes admitted familiarity with the curves over the Casper 
Cutoff, (designated as 1 and 2 in the Record,) after leaving 
the Holladay business intersection and travelling toward Salt 
Lake City (R-305). He testified he didn't remember any curve 
marker signs (R~306) although he had driven the route for 
over four years at the time of the accident. There -vvere curve 
marker signs posted before the first and second curves (R-250). 
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It had been raining on the night of the accident and the shoulders 
of the road were damp and the surface damp (R-250 and 297). 
The road and the second curve, around where the accident 
occurred, was well lighted with street lamps (R-250). The 
hard surface of the road measured 20 feet across, the overall 
width of the road and shoulders was- 32 feet. The accident 
happened at about 3: 15 A.M. Kearns was driving a 1942 
Studebaker car with Idaho license plates (R-245). Kearnes 
admitted that on the night of the accident he gave the curve 
signs in the road only ((a fleeting glance attention," (R-306). 
Then on cross-examination, the defendant dropped his guard 
and exposed the reasons for his recklessness admitting that 
he was ctout of humor" and ((quite put out" because his date 
(Betty T oigo, now defendant's wife) , who had been with him 
earlier in the evening was not at home when he drove by on 
the trip out to Jane Potts' home after he had gone off the route 
and stopped to see if she had come home (R-306, 307, 308). 
He admitted (R-310) he stated on deposition that he parked 
with the plaintiff and others in the car, and waited for 15 to 
20 minutes to see if Betty got home. This was between 2:30 
and 3:00A.M. 
Officer Van Leeuwen testified that he arrived 15 minutes 
after the accident and his investigation showed these facts: 
' 
The defendant's car travelled between 34 and 41 feet 
from the point where it left the hard surface of the highway 
around thesecond curve (Exhibit I) over to the soft shoulder 
and along that shoulder Northwest 60 feet, the car then cut 
back across the highway 28 feet and crossed over onto the soft 
shoulder and open field on the side of the road in which the 
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car 'vas directed prior to the accident and travelled 84 feet 
North"'est along that open field and across a ditch and finally 
onto a street marker on Arcadia Lane overturning somewhere 
in this last movement and taking out a 4 by 4 wooden street 
marker sign set in cement (R-249) "'ith the car finally laying 
upon its right side (R-254). 
uExhibit M" admitted in evidence, a general diagram of 
the highway, shows the first and second curve of this Casper 
Cutoff separated by about 1100 feet of straight-of-way. The 
Exhibit, according to the scale of the drawing, shows that Ar-
cadia Lane (Exhibit L) is over 300 feet generally north of the 
bend in the second curve. Defendant's car ended up (R-254) 
on Arcadia Lane at the intersection of Holladay Boulevard, 
some 3 50 feet from the curve he failed to negotiate. 
Mrs. Barnard, a witness for the plaintiff who lives across 
the street west of where the car finally stopped testified: ((They 
left the road pretty close to that curve (meaning the second 
curve) and there \"las a telephone pole which comes up that 
34 feet. They missed the telephone pole by approximately 6 
inches; you could. see the tracks very definitely." She stated, 
tC ••• shortly after they careened across the road and over 
... " (R-270). Mrs. Barnard testified: ((There were a lot of 
tall shrubs, weeds, growing on the side of the road, we thought 
they rolled over three or four times. Approximately three 
times, we figured, before they landed on the side in the ~treet 
in Arcadia Lane." She stated, ((that the shrubbery and fernery 
in this part of the lot was knocked down and was mashed and 
matted" for a considerable area (R-271). 
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The Court and jury were asked to believe that all this 
occurred to the defendant's car, (R-297) while he was travel-
ling at a speed of between 35 and 45 miles per hour. 
Plaintiff's testimony was that this occurred while the de-
fendant's speed exceeded 55 to 60 miles per hour (R-200). 
There is a substantial conflict in how the accident occurred. 
Defendant insisting that at no time, either on the way ou.t to 
the Potts _home or on the way back to the point of 
the accident, did the defendant drive in excess of 30 
to 45 miles per hour (R-294, 295, 296). However, his 
former girl friend and the witness who admitted friendliness 
to both parties, Jane Potts, testified . (R-261) that she noted 
defendant's speedometer register 80 miles per hour at one 
point on the way to her home as defendant drove over 23rd 
East and witness Potts corroborated plaintiff's statement at that 
time that plaintiff asked defendant to slow down. Yet de-
fendant recalled no such speed at 23rd East or no reference by 
plaintiff to the manner in which he was driving (R-295). 
Plaintiff's version of the way the defendant openly took 
the risk of this accident, appears in the Record at page 195: 
.Q: Yes, just tell how you drove over here, the manner, 
what you observed ? 
A: Well, after leaving the business section of Holladay 
on the Holladay Boulevard, we continually picked 
up speed approaching that first curve. 
Q: You say the first curve; you are referring to this area 
here? 
A: Yes, sir; just before reaching that curve, we were go-
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ing pretty fast; I didn't look at the speedomter, I 
don't know how fast, but 've were going "pretty fast." 
Q. When you say Hpretty fast," do you have any idea of 
how fast Hpretty fast" is? 
A: Well, \Ye were going ... 
Q: Your recollection or knowledge? 
A: We were going over 55 miles an hour and, approach-
ing that curve, I became frightened because I noted 
Mr. Kearnes made no attempt to slow down, approach-
ing that curve. I glanced over; he was ... had his 
foot on the brake, his foot on the gas as we started 
around the curve, and I was ... well, very frightened, 
and we were going too fast, and I guess his object 
to put his foot on the brake was to keep the car in 
the road and still maintain the most speed he could, 
and we skidded around that whole curve, while the 
back wheels off the oiled surface of the road; in fact, 
we were off it so far we almost hit a pole sticking out 
into tt~e ... onto the shoulder there at 4500 South 
Street. 
((Exhibit E" identifies the utility pole on the first curve 
that plaintiff referred to teas almost hitting." 
At page 197, the plaintiff further testified: 
Q: About how fast was Mr. Kearnes driving at that time? 
(Referring to when the car had rounded the first curve 
and almost collided with the pole.) 
A: Well, he lost a little speed around that curve: I would 
say he was stil going fifty miles an hour. 
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Q: You said that you observed that Mr. Kearnes was both 
braking his car and acce}erating; is that correct? Is 
that your testimony? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: .. Around that curve? 
A -.:{ . : ... -es, str. 
Q: Is there any particular sensation that a pers<?n feels or 
knows when he feels that this is occurring? 
A: Yes, it feels like you are, like a· car is hugging the road, 
just like some weight in the back of the car; the wheels 
are spinning, and seems like it sits down, like felt 
to me (R-197 and 198). 
Plaintiff ·testified (R-198) that he protested the manner 
in which Kearnes was driving: 
A: Yes, I was very alarmed at the reckless way he was 
doing, and I was very frightened about it, and I said 
then in an alarmed tone, I said, c CW e are not in that 
big a hurry to get home, Pat, slow down." 
Q: What did he do when you made that statement? 
A: He laughed it off. (Underline supplied). 
Q: Did he answer? 
A: In fact, (R-199) he poured it on more on that straight-
a-way there. (Underline supplied). 
Q: Just a moment, did he answer you? 
A: No, he didn't answer. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q: Did you speak directly to him? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Then what happened? 
- A: Well, then, he gained speed on that straight-·1.-way 
again and of course by that time we vvere almost on 
the other curve, and \Ve started around tue other 
curve off on the left-hand side. 
Plaintiff continued (R-200) : 
Q: And about how fast was he going as he approached 
this second curve ? 
A: Well, he wasn't ... it was over fifty-five miles an hour. 
Q: Did he at any time prior to entering that curve, at-
tempt to brake-put the brake on? 
1-J..: Not to slow down, no. 
Q: What did he do? 
A: He did the same thing, stunt driving; he put on the 
brake and the gas at the · same time, and the car 
swerved sidev;ards at that point on the left-hand s.ide 
of the road clear around the curve (R-200). (u-nder-
line supplied). 
On pages 201, 202 and 203 of the P'-ecord, plainti!f con-
cluded his version of the accident. 
The defendant Kearnes, while denying that he was gail ty 
of stunt driving around these two curves, confirmed the !Jlain-
11 
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tiffs testimony that ttafter coming out ~£ the .fi~st curve he 
d h l On '' Kearnes makes thts admtsston on cross poure t e coa · 
examination (R-316) · 
Q: Mr. Kearnes, if I recall your answer to Mr. Nielson 
on direct examination, you made this statement, CCI 
accelerated the car after completing the first curve, 
and I think I was going 45 miles on hour, and, when 
I hit the second curve, I didn't even apply the brakes;" 
was that your testimony? 
A: If that is what the records show. 
Q: Do you recall making that statement? 
A: Yes. 
On page 318 of the Record, on cross-examination, the 
defendant testified that he didn't apply the brakes before the 
second curve, but that this entire accident was caused by the 
car seeming to slide a little bit when he stepped on the brakes 
(R-317). This last conflicting version of Mr. Kearnes' ex-
planation of the accident was noted in a statement he made on 
a deposition of October 9, 1948, and appears more fully in the 
record, page 316, 31 7. 
Respondent has purposely included the testimony at some 
length in this Statement of Facts in order to show the basic 
conB.ict between the defendant's testimony negativing willful 
misconduct and the plaintiff's explanation of the accident in 
which he charged stunt driving and willful misconduct and 
'vith which the trial court was evidently impressed. 
12 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
1. The trial court did not commit error in granting plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial at the conclusion of the first trial. 
2. Both trial courts, on the evidence submitted properly 
overruled defendant's motions for directed verdict. 
3. The plaintiff was not as a matter of law guilty of ac-
quiescence or assumption of the risk of defendant's willful 
misconduct. 
ARGUMENT 
GRANTING A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL RESTS 
WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 
TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT AN APPELLATE COURT 
WILL NOT Il'JTERFERE UNLESS AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION CLEARLY APPEARS. 
There is no longer novelty to this well-settled rule of law. 
The Courts of Utah, California, Arizona, Kansas, Washington 
and Oklahoma and the overwhelming weight of authority are 
all in accord. 
In the recent case of .tiVfoser vs. Zion's Cooperative l~1er­
cantile Institution~ 197 Pacific 2nd 136, decided August 29, 
1948, this court considered this question. Justice Wolfe stated: 
~]t is a matter now too v1ell settled to admit of any 
serious dispute (and appellants do not contend other-
wise) that the question of granting or denying a mo-
tion for new trial is a matter largely \vithin the discre-
tion of the trial court. White vs. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; Van Dyke vs. Ogden 
13 
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Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 r. 50; Utah State Na-
tional Bank vs. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 781; 
Thompson vs. Bown Live Stock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 
P. 651; Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 
709. This rule applies whether the motion is based 
upon insufficiency of the evidence or upon newly dis-
covered evidence. See cases above cited and V aliotis vs. 
Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; 
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and 
Trimble vs. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 
P. 2d 67 4. This court cannot substitute its discretion 
fo~ that of the trial court. James vs. Robertson, 39 
Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A. 782. We do not 
ordinarily interfere with rulings of the trial court in 
either granting or denying a motion for new trial, and 
unless abuse of, or failure to exercise,- discretion on the 
part of the trial. judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling 
of the trial judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. 
vs. Moyle, et al, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; White vs. Union 
Pacific Ry. Co. supra; Utah State National Bank vs. 
Livingston, supra;. Clark vs. · Los Angeles & S. L. R. 
Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble vs. Union 
Pacific Stages, supra. See also Harrison vs. Sutter St. 
Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019, 1020. 
In Thompson vs. Bozvn Live.rtock Co., cited above, our 
Supreme Court held: 
((Such has been the recognized rule in this jurisdic-
tion. The trial court can grant a new trial on con-
flicting evidence because such a motion invokes a com-
pound of the discretionary and judicial function of the 
Court." (Underline supplied). 
In Perrin vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 201 Pac. 405, our 
Supreme Court asserted: 
((If in the Court's judgment the jury failed to give 
14 
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such weight to the testimony as it was entitled to re-
ceive, it was no abuse of discretion to grant a new trial. 
Consideration of the weight of the evidence on motion 
for a new trial is peculiarly within the province of the 
trial court (as has also been held by California, where 
our Code derives.), 
The position of the California Supreme Court on this 
question is 'thoroughly set out in a recent decision, Y c.1"! vs. 
Johnson, (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. Ct. of Appeals) 206 P 2nd 13, 
decided May 16, 1949: 
((Our Supreme Court, in comparable cases, has fre-
quently enunciated the rule governing appellate courts 
in passing upon such questions. For instance, it said 
in Brooks vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 2 7 Cal. 
2d 305, 307, 163 ,P. 2nd 689, 690: tin passing upon a 
motion for a new trial based upon the insufficiency 
of the evidence, it is the exclusive province of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, deter-
mine the probative force of testimony, and v1eigh the 
evidence. People vs. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal. 2d, 7, 161 
P. 2d 934; Green_ vs. Soule, 145 Cal. 96, 102, 78 P. 
3 3 7. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence 
upon such motion t11e court may draw inferences op-
posed to those dravvn at the trial, Jv.Iercantile Trust Co. 
vs. Sunset Road Oil Co., 176 Cal. 451, 456, 168 P. 
1033~ and where the only conflicts consist of inferences 
deduced from uncontradicted probative facts, the court 
may resolve such conflicts in determining whether the 
case should be retried. Cauhape vs. Security Savings 
Bank, 118 Cal. 82, 84, 50 P. 310. It is only where it can 
be said as a matter of law that there is no substantial 
evidence to support a contrary judgment that an appel-
late court will reverse the order of the trial court. (Un-
derline supplied.) See Dempsey vs. Market St. 'R. R. 
Co., 23 Cal. 2d 110 ( 113), 142 P. 2d 929.' 
15 
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celt also stated, in Williams vs. Field Transportation 
Co., 28 Cal. 2nd 696, £?98, 171 P. 2d 722, 723: 'An 
order granting a new trial upon the grouna of the in-
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment 
will not be _disturbed upon appeal, unless there be a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion. 'All presumptions 
are in favor of the order and it will be affirmed if it 
is sustainable on any gro.und. Mazzotta vs. Los Angeles 
Ry. Corporation, 25 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 153 P. 2nd 338, 
and cases cited. The trial court in considering a motion 
for new trial is not bound by a conflict in the evidence, 
and has not abused its discretion when there is any 
evidence which would support a judgment in favor of 
the moving party.' (Underline supplied). Ballard 
vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 28 Cal. 2nd 357, 170 Pac. 
2nd 465, 467. Even if the evidence is uncontradicted, 
the trial judge may draw inferences from it contrary 
to those made by the jury, and it is his duty to resolve 
such conflicts in determining whether the issues should 
be retried. Only when, as a matter of law, there is no 
no substantial evidence to support a contrary judgment, 
rna y an appellate court reverse an order granting a new 
trial. Brooks vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 27 
Cal. 2d 305, 163 P. 2d 689; Mazzotta vs. Los Angeles 
Ry. Corporation, Supra." 
"In Hames vs. Rust, 14 Cal. 2d 119, at page 124, 92 
P. 2d 1010, at page 1012, the Supreme Court also as-
serted: tWhen the motion is granted, as here, for in-
sufficiency of the evidence, it is only in rare cases show-
ing abuse of discretion that an appellate court will 
interfere because the trial judge must weigh all the 
evidence and determine the just conclusion to be 
drawn therefrom. Hanlon Drydock & Shipbuilding 
Co., vs. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 230, 232, 268 
P. 385. It cannot be held that a trial court has abused 
its discretion where there is a conflict in the evidence 
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or where there is any evidence which would support 
a judgment in favor of the n1oving party.'' (Underline 
supplied). 
ttThi~ court, in the case of Kehlor vs. Satterlee, 3 7 
.Cal. App. 2d 116, 117, 98 P. 2d 759, 760, where plain-
tiff' s_ motion for a ne"' trial was granted, said that an 
order granting a new trial, "rhen it is predicated upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence, will-not be- disturbed 
upon appeal, except upon a showing of clear and mani-
fest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial ·court in 
respect to the granting of the same; _that the rule is 
simple in its application when there ~s a substantial 
conflict in the evidence upon the issues to be decided, 
but that even tlf there be no conflict, the discretionary 
power of the trial court still remains, as stated by this 
court in the case of Otten vs. Spreckels, 24 Cal. App. 
251-257, 141 P. 224, 226,' quoting from the Otten case 
as follows: (Moreover, even in cases where there may 
not appear to be a conflict in the evidence, and \vhere all 
the proofs seem to be favorable to the one or the 
other of the parties litigant, the question as to the 
probative force or evidentiary value of the testimony, 
in a proceeding on a motion for a new trial based upon 
the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify 
the verdict, is one whose determination is with the 
trial court.' (Underline supplied.) 
((In Efinoff vs. Shephard, 77 Cal. App. 2nd 818, 176, 
P. 2d 407, 'vhere plaintiff's motion for a new trial after 
verdict for defendant was granted and affirmed, the 
court said that it is a well settled rule of law that a 
trial court has a wide discretion in granting a new 
·trial ori the ground of insufficiency of the evidence; 
that' the trial judge is said to be in the position of a 
_(th.i_rteenth. juror,'. w~th full power to weigh·· the evi-
.. : <Y, dence .and to reach his own conclusion _.as to the proba-
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tive value thereof. It- quoted from Ogando vs. Car-
quinez G.rammar School District, 24 CaL App. 2d 
567, 569, 75 P. 2d 641, that it is only in rare instances 
and on very .·strong grounds that a reviewing court 
will- set aside an order granting ·a new trial. Also it 
said that in considering such a. motion· it it not. only 
the trial cqurt' s pt:ovince but its duty. to scrutinize and 
. weigh the evidence, and if in its opinion the facts upon 
which the decision of the jury is based are insufficient 
to justify that decision, or if it believes that the weight 
of the evidence is against the decision, a n~w trial 
should be granted, even though the inferences it may 
draw are opposed to those drawn by the jury;· and if, 
therefore, on appeal the case shows a reasonable or 
fairly debatable justification for the trial court's order, 
or the evidence presents a situation where reasonable 
minds might differ in their deductions, said order will 
not be set aside, even though the court of appellate 
jurisdiction might take a view different from that of 
the trial court, or believe the evidence would be suf-
ficient to support a judgment in the event a new trial 
had been denied. 
A leading Arizona case, Hunts1nan vs. First National Bank 
of El Paso} 243 P. 598 holds: 
c (Whether or not a new trial should be granted for 
the reason that the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence is a question peculiarly within the sound 
legal discretion of the trial judge, who has the advan-
tage of seeing the witnesses, or hearing their testimony 
orally delivered, and of observing their den1eanor and 
conduct upon the stand. (Underline supplied). Hence 
the exercise of sound discretion will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless clear abuse thereof is apparent." 
celt is hardly necessary for an appellate court to say 
that when a trial is had before a jury their verdict will 
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not be set aside if there is any substantial evidence, or 
if two different conclusions could reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence; . . . But the rules governing trial 
courts in reviewing verdicts because not supported by 
sufficient evidence are not the same as those govern-
. ing the appellate court. The Trial· Courts may weigh 
the evidence and if they think injustice has been done, 
should grant a new trial. It is their ·duty to supervise 
the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial if the ver-
dict in the opinion of the court is against the weight 
of the evidence, or if it is arbitrary' and 1nanifestly or 
clearly wrong ,or if it appears to be the result of passion, 
prejudice or misconduct of the jury. The granting of 
a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against 
the weight of the evidence is exclusively within the 
province of the trial court and the appellate court will 
only look into the record to see if there is any substan-
tial evidence to support the verdict ... and unless it 
is shown that the discretion of the trial court was 
abused, the appellate court is powerless to interfere." 
t 1£ after a full consideration of the ca~e the trial 
court was satisfied that the verdict was not supported 
by the evidence and that substantial justice had not 
been done oetween the parties, -it was its duty, in the 
exercise of a sound discretion to set the verdict aside.'' 
In Kansas, see Davts and Central States Fire Insurance 
Company, 245 P 1062: 
"It has been the unvarying decision of this court to 
permit no verdict to stand unless both the jury and the 
· court trying the cause, could within the rules prescribed, 
approve the same. When the judgment,· of the trial 
judge tells him the v:erdict is wroQg; wheth.~t from mis-
take, or prejudice or other cause, no dutr is more im-
perative than that of setting it aside and remanding the 
question at issue to another jury: While the case is 
before the jury for their consideration, the jury are 
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the exclusive judges of all questions of fact;· but when: 
Jhe. matter comes before the Court upon a_ -motion for 
a new trial,_ it then b~comes the duty of the trial judge 
to determine Vlhethe.t the verdict is erroneous.' ' l-Ie 
·must be controlled by his own judgment, and riot by 
that of the jury. When a trial judge overrules a m9tion 
pro fonna, ·and declines to look into the facts ·or pass 
·):~')<.· upon its sufficiency, he misconceives his duty·· and com-· 
tnits fatal error. He has no right to- c stand out of the 
way' and against his judgment overrule such a motion. 
He must approve or disapprove the verdict. If he 
approves, he may overrule the motion for a new trial; 
. if he disapproves, he should set it aside and permit 
another jury to pass upon the facts." 
And see also Myers vs. Wright} 208 P 2nd 589, decided 
July 8, 1949, ·Kansas. 
In Washington, see Griffin vs. Wilson} 232 Pac. 690: 
t(If, after fully considering the testimony in the light 
of the verdict, the trial judge was satisfied that verdict 
was against the v1eight of the evidence, and that sub-
.stantial justice had not been done between the parties, 
it was his duty to grant a new trial." 
Appellant's counsel labors the point that since the trial 
court, in granting the motion for new trial, stated it was not 
basing its decision on any one ground, but making its ruling 
without specifying a reason so that on appeal, plaintiff might 
argue any. ground in support of the Court's action, the Court 
acted arbitrarily and indicated that it simply disagreed with 
the jury as to the facts .. No record of the colloquy between 
the trial judge and counsel has been certified in this record, but 
appellant seems to have improperly quoted the Court's re-
marks. As respondent recalls the- facts, the trial judge orally 
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granted the motion for new trial and counsel for respondent 
inquired if the order granting new trial should be prepared on 
a specific statutory ground, to which the trial judge replied 
he was not basing his decision on any one ground. 
Respondent submits it is what the trial court says in its 
written order granting new trial, and not what the trial judge 
says in oral opinion or in colloquy with counsel, which is de-
terminative as to whether reasons are assigned for granting 
the new trial. See Baker t'S. Mutual Life lnsutance Co., 201 
Pac. 2nd 813, decided January 8, 1949, wherein the Supreme 
Court of Washington holds: 
''We are aware that what is determinative as to 
whether a reason or reasons have been assigned for 
the granting of a new trial is not what the trial judge 
has said in an oral opinion or in a colloquy with counsel, 
but rather what the Court says in its wrtiten order ... " 
"We have held again and again, that on an appeal 
from such order, our inquiry is limited to the determi- -
nation of the question of whether the evidence was 
sufficient to take the case to a jury, and that, unless 
we can say that the verdict of the jury was a matter of 
law, the only verdict that could be rendered, the order 
granting a new trial must be affirmed. The reasons 
for and against this holding are well stated in the 
rna jority opinion and the dissent in Bond vs. Ovens, 
14 7 Pac. 2nd 514, and further discussion would a vail 
nothing. The jury clearly could have returned a ver-
dict adverse to the appellant's." 
Also see Potts vs. Laos, 200 P 2nd 505. 
Appellant complains that the trial court's actions in the 
instant case (his Brief, page 19) granted the new trial arbi-
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trarily and only for the reason that the court might have desired 
the verdict to be other than that which was rendered. 
A reading of the Bond case cited above, should assist ap-
pellant in evaluating the function of the trial court tn our 
system of judicature. 
c (The real reason why the granting of a new trial_ by 
a general order is rarely, if ever, overruled is that the 
appellate court must ordinarily assume, in the absence 
of a stated reason, that the order was, or at least may 
have been, granted in the exercise of the trial court's 
inherent power. If the exact ground of the order is 
stated, the situation may be quite different. For ex-
amp!~, in the recent case of Gavin vs. Everton, Wash., 
144 P 2nd 7 3 5, the court set aside a verdict for the de-
-fendants in a personal injury case and granted the 
plaintiff a new trial, upon the sole ground that the 
evidence in the. case showed that the defendants were 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The court 
could, and did review that order by simply reading 
the evidence; but, v1hen a court simply grants a new 
trial withqut assigning its reasons, or when it says that 
it does so on the ground that substantial justice has not 
been done, there may be much more than evidence in-
volved. There may be matters that do not appear in 
the record at all, matters which, for one reason or 
another, could not be made to appear. 
((The right of a trial jU:dge to set aside a verdict if he 
believes that substantial justice has not been done is 
probably as old as the jury system itself. ·we need not\ 
attempt to determine that; for, it is sufficient for our 
present purpose to point out that the right to trial by 
jury and the right of the trial judge to set a jury verdict 
aside and grant a new trial, on the ground that sub-
stantial justice has not been done, have existed side by 
side for centuries in the Efi:glish courts, and in our state 
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courts since their creation, and, in fact, in all other 
systems of judicature founded upon the English com-
mon law. The possesion of that power makes the 
- office of a trial judge one of peculiar responsibility, 
dignity, and importance in our system of the adminis-
tration of justice; for, the appellate courts have no such 
power. They can set aside a jury verdict and grant a 
new trial only by pointing out some specific legal errror, 
such as a faulty instruction, an erroneous ruling with 
respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence, mis-
conduct of counsel, etc. It follows, if the trial judge 
fails to exercise the power in a proper case that an 
unjust verdict may result in a judgment that cannot 
be set aside or in any way disturbed." 
Measured by these principles of law, can it be said that the 
trial court committed reversible error? We submit that it did 
not. 
There is substantial evidence in this Record to support a 
judgment in favor of the respondent, the moving party below 
for the new trial. Plaintiffs testimony and evidence on de-
fendant's willful misconduct is not only conflicting, -with de-
fendant's explanation of the accident, but as the learned trial 
judge orally remarked during the argument on the motion, the 
defendant's negativing testimony was impossible to accept. 
The inherent element of improbability of defendant's own 
testimony plus the uncontroverted physical facts of the acci-
dent impressed the trial court and caused him to set aside the 
verdict in order to prevent substantial injustice. Previously, 
in this Brief, under the statement of the case, respondent has 
shown that defendant Kearnes was familiar with the dangerous 
curves of the Casper Cutoff and had been familiar with them 
since 1943; that there were curve marker signs posted before 
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the curves the night of the accident; that it had been raining on 
the night of the acident; the shoulders and surface of the road 
being dan1p; the curve and road where the accident occurred 
was well-lighted-; the hard surface of the road was narrow 
measuring 20 feet, the overall width including shoulders 32 
feet; that Kearnes paid no attention to any curve signs; these 
facts are controverted. Plaintiff's explanation of the acci-
dent was that the defendant took the risk of this accid{;: 1t by 
performing as a stunt driver, namely, by driving his car into 
these curves while he was both accelerating the engine and 
braking, a peculiar, artful and skillful form of automobile 
manipulation known to the younger crowd by which a car is 
n1ade. to hug the curve and maintain its speed on the road. 
Defendant Kearnes testified that his speed never exceeded 
35 to 45 miles per hour. The plaintiff maintained that defend-
ant's speed around the curves was between 55 and 60 miles per 
hour. The t~ial court chose to believe the plaintiffs story and 
it is understandable in the face of defendant's other testimony 
on spee4. Previously in this Brief reference has been made 
to defendant's denial that he registered 80 miles per hour on 
the trip out to Jane Potts' house. Witness P~tts corroborated 
the speed of 80 miles per hour and the fact that plaintiffs 
protest then seemed to bring defendant down to a more reason-
able speed. In plain English, it was willful and ~wanton mis-
conduct for the defendant to perform as a stunt man, accelerat-
ing and braking his auton1qbile sin1ultaneously at 55 to 60 miles· 
per hour, around these dangerous County curves, at 3 o'clock 
in the morning over a wet, slippery and narrow pavement, and 
especially after the danger had been so obvious to him, having 
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barely avoided a serious accident 1100 feet back (between 10 
to 12 seconds earlier at the speed plaintiff testified he was going) 
in near missing the utility pole on the first curve. Defendant 
intended and did negotiate the second curve in the same reck-
less manner as he did the first, seeing how close he could come 
to causing an accident. He drove as he did, because by his own 
admission, he was uout of humor" with his lady escort. The 
protest of the plaintiff to ((slow down Pat, we're not in that 
big a hurry to get home'' was laughed off. Defendant's answer 
to this protest was more recklessness as he ((poured on the coal'' 
and seconds later caused the accident which maimed the plain-
tiff for life. The physical facts add up to the same conclusion, 
wilfull misconduct. For argument's sake accept defendant's 
explanation that he merely failed to negotiate the curve, in 
that tcthe car seemed to slide on something on the pavement 
just before taking the curve'~ at 3 5 miles per hour. One would be 
naive to believe that a 1942 light Studebaker car would travel 
34 to 41 feet off the hard surface pavement and over an oppo-
site wet shoulder, then along that shoulder 60 feet, barely 
missing another telephone pole, skidding back across the high-
way out of control 28 feet over to the other sho~lder of the 
road and travelling 84 feet out of control mashing down shrub-
bery and fernery in the open field, rolling over, knocking out 
a wood and cement street marker and ending up on its side in 
a street intersection (Arcadia Lane) which was geographically 
350 feet away from the bend in the curve where it all began, 
and that this gyration was caused by simply skidding on the 
pavement at 3 5 miles an hour. The manifest weight of this 
evidence was in favor of the plaintiff and conclusively shov1s 
that defendant performed as a stunt man and not as a host. 
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DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECT-
ED· VERDICT EITHER FOR FAILURE TO MAKE OUT 
WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OR PLAINTIFF'S ACQUIES-
CENCE IN SUCH CONDUCT. 
Appellant closes his argument suggesting that even if the 
trial court exercised its discretion soundly in granting the mo-
tion for the 11:ew trial, it should have nevertheless directed a 
verdict in defendant's favor because the evidence failed to 
,prove a case of willful misconduct as a matter of law, and 
second, that if it did, plaintiff's conduct amounted to assump-
tion of that risk. 
Treating the first proposition, respondent submits that if 
his evidence was substantial enough to set aside a jury verdict 
against him, it was sufficient to support a judgment in plaintiff's 
favor and the court did not err in refusing to grant defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict. This proposition raises a ques-
tion of law and is the same in nature and substance as the 
motion for a new trial. The trial court felt that plaintiff's 
evidence so preponderated against the verdict as to leave no 
justifiable basis upon which that verdict could stand. The 
question then simply is, did the plaintiff's evidence, which the 
trial court chose to believe, justify a. finding of willful mis-
conduct? 
Appellant's cases in support of his argument can be dis-
tinguished from the instant case for the reason that in his cited 
cases willful misconduct cannot be predicated on speeq alone. 
As suggested many times in this Brief this case is predicated 
on more than mere speed. Defendant's liability is based upon 
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speed, plus a known dangerous curve condition, a narrow road, 
wet surface, a defiant mental attitude, and a stunt driving per-
formance that succeeded in coming close to near accident a few 
seconds before the accident happened. The following cases are 
in support of. a fact situation similar to the instant case and 
sustain a finding of willful misconduct. 
Herrell vs. HickockJ (Ohio) 197 N. E. 241. Plaintiff 
was ricijng as a guest in defendant's car along a road familiar 
to the defendant on which there were two curves 600 to 700 
feet apart. The car was traveling 65 to 70 miles per hour and 
at the first curve swerved to the left. The plaintiff protested 
to defendant but he njust laughed" and ccdrove faster, if an~ 
thing." Defendant continued to proceed to the second curve 
where he lost control of the car and it turned over, injuring the 
plaintiff. 
The accident occurred in the state of Michigan and was 
governed by the Michigan guest statute which required ((gross 
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct'' of the operator 
in order that a guest might recover. The trial court granted 
a directed verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. 
The appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the 
case for a new trial stating: 
(It seems to us that from the evidence presented it 
was for the jury to say whether Hickok was or was not 
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct on the occa-
sion in question. Driving at a speed of 65 to 70 miles 
an hour, on a road with which he was in all respects 
familiar, its width, curves, and character ... his con-
tinuing with a laugh,_ as the evidence tends to show, 
over the protests of his guests, at an increasing rate of 
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speed toward a second known curve, his loss of control 
of his automobile on a dry pavement in the daytime, 
are all facts and circumstances from which a jury in 
any court in any state might find the ·consequent in-
juries to Miss Herrell to have been proximately caused 
by the willful and wanton misconduct of Hickok." 
In Chandler vs. Quinlan, 78 Pac 2nd 235 (California), 
an action was brought under the California guest statute and 
particularly the portion thereof requiring a finding of. willful 
misconduct on the part of the defendant in order that he be held 
liable. 
The plaintiff was riding as a guest in the automobile driven 
by the defendant. The defendant increased his speed gradual-
ly until he attained a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour. 
As they were approaching a curve plaintiff warned defendant 
to slow down on account of the curve. The defendant said, 
ceo, I guess I can make it." The defendant was again warned 
to slow down because there was a bad curve ahead to v..rhich 
the defendant again replied that he thought he could make it. 
The car was proceeding at to rapid speed to negotiate the turn 
as a result of which it skidded onto the gravel shoulder of the 
highway causing it to get out of control and strike a ditch as 
a result of which plaintiff sustained injury. The jury rendered 
judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The 
appellate couit in sustaining the verdict of the jury below stated: 
ccln the case of Parsons vs. Fuller, 66 Pac. 2nd 430, 
the court also said: 
'We believe that the court properly emphasises knowl-
edge or appreciation "that danger is likely to result.'' 
To us it seen1s clear that one who, while drivtng an 
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automobile, knowingly flirts with danger and, without 
necessity or emergency compelling him, ntakes a chc.nce" 
on killing or injurying himself and others who may be 
so unfortunate as to be riding with him, is gutl ty of 
willful misconduct'." 
In Norton vs. Puter, (California) 32 Pac. 2nd 172, an 
action brought by the plaintiff under the California guest 
statute which limits recovery to cases where the injury sustained 
by the guest resulted from the ~~intoxication or willful mis-
conduct" of the operator. The following quotation from. the 
language of the court sets forth the principal facts as \veli as 
the ruling of the Court: 
HW e are of the opinion the facts of this case show 
that the defendant was guilty of willful misconduct 
in the manner in which he operated his automobile, 
which conduct proximately contributed to the accident 
resulting in the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The 
defendant knew the pavement was wet and slippery; 
his vision was obscured by the falling rain and the 
water on his windshield; the windshield wiper was 
not operating; he knew he was approaching a danger-
ous curve in the highway where he had previously had 
none or two pretty close calls" in escaping simtlar acci-
dents; -he had been warned several times by his son to 
diminish the speed of his car; the machine was running 
55 miles an hour, and was swaying from side to side-
yet with a full appreciation of these dangerous condi-
tions, the defendant recklessly attempted to drive 
around the curve without slackening the excessive speed 
of his machine in violation of Section 113 of the Cali-
fornia Vehicle Act (St. 1923, p. 553, Sec. 113, as 
amended by St. 1931, p. 2120), thereby endangering 
the (lives and limbs' of the occupants of his car. It 
was the exclusive province of the court to determine 
whether the defendant was guilty of willful misconduct 
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in recklessly driving his machine at the rate of 55 miles 
an hour under the circumstances of this case." 
- In Sorrell vs. White, (Vt. 1932) 153 Atl. 329, an action 
brought under the guest statute of vermont which provided 
that the guest could not recover unless the injuries were caused 
by the (gross or willful negligence of the operator.' The de-
fendant had invited the plaint~ff to ride home with him which 
invitation she accepted. After proceeding a half mile the spe~d 
of the car being then increased to 45 or 50 miles an hour, they 
came to a sharp curve in the highway. Just before reaching it 
there was a sign calling attention to the fact that it was 
dangerous. Defendant \Vas acquainted with the locality. A 
witness named Waters riding in the front seat with defendant 
told him to be careful and the plaintiff told him not to go so 
fast, but the defendant just grinned and maintained the same 
speed. As· the car entered the curve it ran into the drainage 
ditch at the end of the road and hit a telephone pole. The 
plaintiff. was thrown out and was injured. In affirming the 
judgment of the court below in favor of the plaintiff the appel-
late Court stated: 
((There may be a vvillful wrong without a direct de-
sign to do harm, and ·the term (willful negligence' 
means a failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless 
disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or 
property of another . . . . 
( ( . . . the jury were justified in finding that the de-
fendant acted with such reckless disregard of. the con-
sequences as affecting the safety of the plaintiff, that 
be became guilty of willful negligence . . . " 
In Jones vs. Hathaway, 70 Pac. 2nd 681, in sustaining the 
verdict of the lower court, the appellate court stated: 
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With so n1uch in mind, together with the rule that as 
far as the ultimate fact of willful misconduct itself is 
concerned, a determination thereof by the trial court 
based upon substantial evidence in its support is con-
clusive on appeal, the determination of the question 
of whether as a matter of law the judgment in the in-
stant case is sustainable becomes one largely of indi-
vidual judicial opinion. With reference to a decision 
by this court on the issue \vhich has been here presented, 
it is concluded that, as a presumably reasonable man, 
had he exercised due care, d~fendant must have known, 
or must have been conscious of and appreciated the 
fact that to drive the automobile at the place where, 
and under the atmospheric conditions which were shown 
to exist, over a wet and slippery pavement, and at the 
rate of speed at which, according to the findings of 
fact, he did drive it, was likely to result in injury to 
plaintiff. To say that the conduct of defendant in thus 
driving an automobile was wanton or reckless or that 
it v;as in disregard of probable consequences thereof, 
is but to express a patent and unmistakable truth. As 
far as substantial evidence in support of the judgment 
is concerned, it would seem at least questionable if 
nothing more appeared than the fact that, over the 
protest of plaintiff, defendant drove the automobile 
at night at the rate of 55 to 60 miles per hour; but 
when to that fact are added the further conditions that 
such speed was continued over a wet and slippery pave-
ment ... through a fog so dense that he could see no 
farther than 100 feet ... up to and immediately pre-
ceding an nS" curve in an underpass which occurred 
at the foot of a (steep downgrade,' it would be contrary 
to common sense to attribute to any reasonable person 
a lack of appreciation of the fact that such driving of 
an automobile was likely to result disastrously." 
To the same effect also are Mescher vs. Brogan, (Iowa) 
272 N. W. 645 and Pepper vs. Morrill, 24 Federal 2nd, 320. 
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Appellant finally urges that even if he be guilty of willful 
misconduct plaintiff assumed that risk by accepting the invi-
tation to ride with him. This again raises the law question, 
does plaintiff's own evidence so clearly show that he acquiesced 
in defendant's willful misconduct as to have required the trial 
court to direct a verdict for defendant. 
Plaintiff's testimony, not previously recited, should now 
be stated. This trip \Vas the first occasion that plaintiff had 
ever ridden in a car operated by defendant· (R-209). Plaintiff 
requested to be taken home first, (R-1 78) but was asked by 
his host to ride out \vith him to take the ladies home (R-180). 
He did this to accommodate the desires of his host and because 
the host had started the car in that direction anyhow (R-180). 
Twice on the trip . out to Jane Potts' residence at 5900 
Holladay Boulevard, plaintiff had effectively protested the 
speed in which cfefendant drove and defendant slowed down 
(R-183, 184) (R-187, 188). On the return trip the road be-
tween the Potts' residence and the first curve is without curves 
(Exhibit ((M") and defendant returned over a different route 
than he took out (R-296) .. Plaintiff protested the manner of 
defendant's driving the moment the danger of accident became 
apparent to him around the first curve (R-198). The fact 
that this protest occurred so shortly before the accident (10-12 
seconds, figuring speed at 60 miles per hour and 1100 feet) as 
to make his protest ineffective and impractical, does not amount 
to a withdrawal of protest or indicate acquiescence or willing-
ness to proceed in the fact of apparent danger. 
The sudden and reckless performance of the defendant 
stunt-driving, around these curves, gave plaintiff little oppor-
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tunity to protest or to insist on being let off. He barely had 
the chance to say, uwe are not in that big a hurry to get home 
Pat, slow down!" Defendant just ulaughed it off" and poured 
it on more on that straight-a-way (R-198, 199). A guest does 
not assume the risk of danger arising from his host's sudden 
and intentional attempts to flirt with death. See Wright t'S. 
Sellet·s, 78 Pac. 2 209 (Cal. App.) 
Respondent is familiar with this Court's recent ruling in 
Esernia vs. Ot,-efland Moving Co., 206 Pac,-. 2d 621, and Maybee 
t'S. Maybee, 11 Pac. 2d 973. These cases are clearly distinguish-
able. In both cases the plaintiffs were denied recovery against 
their hosts because the incompetence was clearly apparent to 
them before accepting the rides, weariness and faulty vision. 
And this incompetence was continually present and caused 
near acidents, prior to the accident out of which the suits arose. 
Also the opportunity to leave was present. In the instant case 
there was no awareness of any danger at the time the invitation 
was accepted and no opportunity to leave the car when the 
danger became apparent after that first curve. Chief Justice 
Pratt adopts the language of the Restatement of Torts in the 
Esernia case, the sensible explanation here to defendant's 
claim that plaintiff assumed the risk of this accident: 
C(On the other hand, if the incompetence is not dis-
covered until the vehicle is on a lonely road in a part of 
the country with which the plaintiff is unfamiliar, par-
ticularly late at night, it may be the part of prudence 
to remain in the vehicle, unless the driver is so reckless 
or incompetent that a reasonable man would recognize 
that there was a great likelihood of an accident . " 
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Under the circumstances and evidence in this case, the 
Trial Court could not say as a matter of law that the plaintiff 
assumed the risk of defendant's willful misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that the decision of the Trial Court 
be affirmed. 
R.es pectfull y submitted, 
A. W. SANDACK 
Attorney for Respondent 
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